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Book Review
David Kennedy, A World of Struggle: How Power, Law, and Expertise Shape Global 
Political Economy, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2016: pp. 312, 
$29.95 (hardcover)
Reviewed by Zinaida Miller
How and why does a world in constant confl ict come to appear as one of 
legal, political, and economic order? In World of Struggle, David Kennedy argues 
that people deploying the vocabularies of expertise shape the global order by 
fi rst engaging in continuous, ruthless battles and subsequently hiding those 
skirmishes from view. In the process, “struggle and distribution disappear 
as experts embody the voice of reason and outcomes are assimilated as facts 
rather than contestable choices” (5). In many arenas, those facts become 
the hardened concrete of unequal distribution, a set of arrangements made 
incontestable through invisibility: the obscurity of the expert decision-makers, 
the rationalized language of decision, and the veiling of prior struggle in present 
agreement work together to naturalize the status quo. In this ambitious and 
far-reaching book, Kennedy reveals what is at stake in understanding struggle 
and confl ict as endemic rather than exceptional and in comprehending law 
as a tool for distributing resources and power rather than an instrument “for 
ordering, problem-solving, or expressing global values” (12).
Structured in three parts, the book fi rst analyzes global political economy 
by focusing on how background ideas about economics and politics (as 
well as about actors and structures) shape distributional outcomes and how 
expert struggle (which blends “the saying, the insisting and the enforcing” 
(54)) constitutes the world. In the second part, which examines particular 
professions through their area of expertise, Kennedy explains how expert 
knowledge “operates to constitute actors and shape structures” while serving 
as an instrument of allocation (86). The fi nal part explores the multiple ways 
in which international legal expertise simultaneously distributes and obscures 
its distributive role. In World of Struggle, law plays a key role both as a ubiquitous 
aspect of global struggles over authority and legitimacy and as a cautionary 
tale about the inequality and injustice produced by systematically ignoring the 
power of expertise.
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World of Struggle off ers both substantive and methodological interventions 
in studies of global governance, expertise, international law, and political 
economy. It is in many ways a culmination of Kennedy’s work over past 
decades as well as a primer in the author’s eclectic method; it both revisits 
and builds upon earlier themes and discussions.  The book is preoccupied 
not with experts as a group of individuals (Kennedy goes to some lengths to 
explain that the experts themselves are only part of the story1) but rather with 
expertise itself—or, perhaps more precisely, the project of deploying expert 
languages in both their technical and vernacular forms. The book off ers a 
self-consciously “mid-level” intervention that avoids causal explanation and 
largely eschews agent/structure debates. Rather, the work focuses on how 
those who use the language of expertise “see and create” the world (124), 
how and over what they argue, whom they seek to persuade, how and where 
coercion and persuasion meet or diverge, and how what begins as an argument 
comes to be seen as a fact—and can, expertly, be reformulated once again as 
argument (136). More than in any past work, Kennedy here takes his reader 
through his own cartographic technique, tracing his eff orts to map the habits, 
thoughts, consciousness, and actions of those who deploy expertise. In the 
process, he demonstrates how the mobilization of expert knowledge entails 
the production of decision and interpretation as fact and common sense.
Kennedy’s exploration of expertise also considers the capaciousness of the 
vocabulary not only to encompass competing and contradictory arguments, 
but to “straddle the technical and the political” (194). In parsing the experience 
of expertise, Kennedy describes the allure and power of what he calls 
“sophisticated disenchantment,” (194) a posture characterized by a peculiar 
combination of faith and cynicism and a particular mechanism of diff usion. 
Through this mechanism, an increasingly indeterminate expert vocabulary—
often expressed as or through law—becomes prevalent precisely by virtue of its 
plasticity and malleability. Fields with staying power are those, like law, that 
combine “complexity and fragmented loss of decisiveness” (153) and whose 
practitioners are aware of “the diverse and contradictory quality” of the ethics, 
materials, and institutions of their expertise (252). Kennedy writes early in 
the book that “[i]n sophisticated and disenchanted fi elds, the vocabulary 
deployed to make, defend, and interpret decisions is composed of arguments 
that accommodate sharp disagreement and subtle compromise and in which 
people seem both to be invested and to have lost faith” (9). He fi nds this same 
fulcrum of conviction and doubt among multiple actors—including “lawyers, 
economists, businesspeople, scholars and policy makers” (90)—and in diff erent 
arenas, primarily international law, human rights, and economic development. 
1. “I use the terms ‘expert’ and ‘expertise’ with some hesitation because they focus attention 
on a class of people and a kind of knowledge rather than a characteristic role and mode of 
speaking, deciding and acting in struggle.” (3) See also p. 137 (“Although foreground players 
might be thought to specialize in ‘broad debates’ while background experts tended to 
‘technical argument,’ in contemporary global economic and political life everyone makes 
arguments and accepts assertions of both types.”).
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Through this focus, Kennedy revisits fi elds that appeared in earlier works, 
particularly The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism (2005).
In this review I examine Kennedy’s notion of “sophisticated disenchant-
ment” specifi cally as it functions within the “virtue fi elds” of humanitarian 
and human rights, thus focusing on only one particular part of the worlds 
and work of expertise depicted in World of Struggle. I do so by returning to Dark 
Sides to refl ect on the gaps and consistencies between the two works, published 
twelve years apart.
Looking at the two works in tandem illuminates the images in each: 
The picture painted in World of Struggle of human rights and humanitarian 
professionals diff ers subtly but markedly from that depicted in Dark Sides. 
The human rights professionals of Dark Sides are unwitting perpetrators of 
incidental harms whereas the experts in Struggle have incorporated doubt into 
their daily practice. Comparing the two works raises the question: Did World 
of Struggle represent a self-critique of earlier work, or did humanitarians take 
up (indirectly) some version of the challenge to “disenchant [their] routine 
humanitarian practices”2 and, in the process, become both more sophisticated 
and more resistant to the deeper sense of responsibility in governance that 
Kennedy calls for in both works?3 
In Dark Sides, Kennedy argued that endemic blind spots and biases in 
humanitarianism made it diffi  cult for practitioners to see the consequences of 
their work. He began the book by cautioning:
The international humanitarians I have known rarely place the darker sides of 
their endeavors center stage, where they can be assessed and either refuted or 
taken into account in future work . . . . With so much evil out there to fi ght, 
it hardly seems worth it to focus on the downsides of the few humanitarian 
practices which have been set in motion. But these darker sides can swamp 
the benefi ts of humanitarian work, and well-intentioned people can fi nd 
themselves unwittingly entrenching the very things they have sought voice 
to denounce.4 
In this reading, the experts may be at times aware of the dark sides of their 
work, but they avoid taking those consequences into account strategically. The 
dark sides are marginal to the enchanted nature of the work; as a book, Dark 
Sides thus focused on unintended consequences, blind spots, and biases. The 
diagnosis was of an aversion to critique and pragmatism; the cure would come 
through self-assessment, weighing of costs and benefi ts, and an admission of 
2. DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIANISM 
xix (2004) [hereinafter DARK SIDES].
3. As Karen Engle notes, Kennedy began to contemplate some of these questions already 
in 2009. Karen Engle, Self-Critique, (Anti) Politics and Criminalization: Refl ections on the History and 
Trajectory of the Human Rights Movement, in NEW APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE 
EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN EXPERIENCES 41, 47 (José María Beneyto & David Kennedy eds., 
2012).
4. DARK SIDES, at xiii.
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responsibility for not just virtue but vice. More than once, Kennedy referred 
to the need for humanitarian professionals to “disenchant” themselves and 
their tools, always referring to the hope that such disenchantment would itself 
produce a sense of responsibility, power, governance, and rulership.5 In many 
ways, disenchantment is the key term of Dark Sides, the glue that holds together 
the explorations of diff erent fi elds. In the fi nal pages of the book, Kennedy 
calls for a new humanitarianism through that very process: 
For the humanitarianism I imagine, we would need to disenchant our 
practices, our expertise, and our professional postures, let go attachments 
to much that humanitarianism has become. I have written about my own 
experiences of disenchantment because I am convinced that for each of us 
moments of decision, of responsibility and of freedom in unknowing, will 
arise from our own moments of disenchantment . . . .6
Trenchant and provocative in 2004, such considerations seemed quickly to 
have been internalized rather than rejected by those very same fi elds, perhaps 
most directly the humanitarian aid and human rights enterprises. By the 
mid- and certainly late 2000s, many humanitarian professionals, activists, 
and experts openly articulated the critiques themselves.7 Revealing costs or 
consequences was potentially less disruptive than it had initially appeared or 
was hoped; pragmatically weighing upsides and downsides, acting without 
total faith in the work, and using the fi elds’ tools without enchanting them 
soon became tools of the trade themselves. To be involved in humanitarianism 
was, itself, to be committed to incorporating and reconstructing the critiques 
themselves—not perfectly or universally, but also neither sporadically nor 
infrequently.
In recent years, scholars of humanitarian aid and human rights have 
highlighted the propensity of those working in these fi elds to incorporate 
the declaration of “dark sides” into their practices, to make it potentially 
5. Consider, for example, the following: “Perhaps we will learn to disenchant our routine, humanitarian 
practices and understand the damage we sometimes do.” Id. at xix. On humanitarianism 
writ large: “I am concerned to identify common assumptions or terms of reference which 
blind policy makers to the consequences of their eff ort, preventing them from viewing 
their initiatives with cool, pragmatic eyes. But even when humanitarians are able to work 
pragmatically, disenchanting their tools and entering the instrumental cost/benefi t world of 
modern policy making at its best, problems can remain.” Id. at 114. On the law of war: “By 
rooting out bias, disenchanting the doctrines and institutional tools which substitute for 
analysis . . . we might achieve a humanitarianism which could throw light on its own dark 
sides.” Id. at 309.
6. Id. at 355.
7. The change is even more evident in comparison with Kennedy’s much earlier foray into 
ambivalence and ambiguity in human rights, a personal account of a human rights mission 
to Uruguay in 1985, which was even more ambivalently received. That article was fi rst 
accepted and then rejected by the Harvard Law Review, a change Kennedy later attributed 
to the editors’ sense that such “moral ambiguity risked sacrilege.” DAVID KENNEDY, THE 
RIGHTS OF SPRING: A MEMOIR OF INNOCENCE ABROAD 9 (2009).
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even a required aspect of the job.8 Human rights lawyers and activists 
and humanitarian aid workers in the Israeli-Palestinian context provide a 
particularly striking (but hardly unique) example.9 They have developed an 
entire vocabulary for discussing the inevitable, inherent, and endemic bad 
consequences of ostensibly virtuous work. Israeli human rights lawyers debate 
the cost of legitimizing a broader system of oppression through their litigation 
on behalf of individual clients.10 The justifi cations for continuing their 
work despite the evident dark sides diff er depending upon the individuals, 
nationalities, activities, and stakes involved, but in each case, their thinking 
begins from the premise that their work actively facilitates the very system that 
it aims to chasten, limit, or overturn.11 This thinking has now been woven into 
their professional discourse: Articulating cynicism, bad faith, disenchantment, 
dark sides, or consequences now represents a critical aspect of the work itself. 
Foreign aid workers frequently voice the concern that their work subsidizes or 
normalizes an occupation they normatively oppose.12 In a 2015 article, the U.S. 
8. Some years earlier, Alex de Waal had gestured already to the capacity of the humanitarian 
aid fi eld to absorb critique in ways that embraced at best minor reform rather than 
fundamental change. See ALEX DE WAAL, FAMINE CRIMES; POLITICS & THE DISASTER RELIEF 
INDUSTRY IN AFRICA (1997). See also THE GOLDEN FLEECE: MANIPULATION AND INDEPENDENCE 
IN HUMANITARIAN ACTION (Antonio Donini ed., 2012); MICHAEL BARNETT, EMPIRE OF 
HUMANITY: A HISTORY OF HUMANITARIANISM 195– 219 (2011). For a crucial engagement with 
critiques of rights and human rights as a foundation for continuing human rights work and 
litigation, see Karl Klare, Critical Perspectives on Social and Economic Rights, Democracy and Separation 
of Powers, in SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: CRITICAL INQUIRIES 
3–22 (Helena Alviar García, Karl Klare & Lucy A. Williams eds., 2015).
9. For a related discussion, see Zinaida Miller, Perils of Parity: Palestine’s Permanent Transition, 47 
CORNELL INT’L L. J. 331 (2014). For a discussion of both the special but also shared nature of 
human rights lawyering in the Israeli-Palestinian context, see Daphna Golan & Zvika Orr, 
Translating Human Rights of the “Enemy”: The Case of Israeli NGOs Defending Palestinian Rights, 46 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 781 (2012).
10. Golan and Orr discuss a 2007 discussion hosted by the Association for Civil Rights in 
Israel, in which leaders of major Israeli human rights organizations described their work as 
rearranging the chairs on the Titanic or as a “fl y on the emperor’s nose” and asked whether 
human rights litigation was in fact assisting the occupation. Golan & Orr, supra note 9, at 
782. 
11. One leading Israeli human rights lawyer who has repeatedly grappled with these questions 
summarized one of the dilemmas in a 2012 interview: “When you’re faced with a system 
that’s systematically violating human rights, on a huge scope, is it right or wrong to sustain 
internal, as opposed to external, resistance? Because when you resist from within, you 
legitimise the system.” Michael Sfard, Is Israel on the High Road to Fascism?, 972 MAG. (Mar. 31, 
2012), https://972mag.com/sfard/39804/ [https://perma.cc/XNT3-3DXS].
12. See, e.g., Peter Hansen, The Response of Western Governments and the U.N. to the Humanitarian Crisis and 
Its Political Implications, in THE POLITICS OF HUMANITARIANISM IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN 
TERRITORIES: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS (The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, Apr. 20-21, 
2004, CD-ROM).
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executive director of the humanitarian organization Médecins sans Frontières 
framed the dilemmas directly:
What our staff  sees, day in and day out, are the medical consequences of the 
occupation. But while we can treat some of our patients’ symptoms, we can’t 
alter the underlying causes of their suff ering. And as the suff ering has become 
normalized, we have been questioning the wisdom of our presence. This is the 
humanitarian’s dilemma: how to alleviate the suff ering of a population while 
not enabling the powers at the root of the pain.13
The repeated invocations of costs and dilemmas suggest less unintended 
consequences than an uncertain and uneasy choice to carry on despite the 
inevitable harm.
In a recent ethnography of the Palestinian human rights situation, Lori 
Allen discusses cynicism and its uses in a context of ongoing confl ict and 
limited—if any—human rights victories.14 In speaking with Palestinian rights 
workers, she found 
widespread awareness of the systemic problems inherent in the human rights 
industry as it developed after Oslo. Simply knowing that they were caught in 
a structure built on crumbling, if not rotten, foundations, however, was not 
enough to cause many to fl ee it entirely. In the stories of human rights workers 
that I recount . . . they describe their eff orts to sidestep the debris as they 
fi gured out where to go next.15 
In Allen’s reading, cynicism about human rights in a context of its continual 
failure under occupation can be a productive “mode of understanding, a 
location from which at least some people remain aloof from the power structures 
that are trying to sweep them up.”16 Although the productive cynicism of 
Palestinian human rights activists diff ers from the confessional collaboration 
of international aid workers or the existential dilemmas of Israeli human right 
litigators, there are related links in the very stability of the machinery. Human 
rights and humanitarian workers are well aware of the dark sides of their work; 
their acknowledgment of harm becomes part of humanitarian expertise.
Kennedy’s call in Dark Sides for practitioners to pragmatically assess costs 
and benefi ts reads quite diff erently against the background of experts whose 
declarations of dark sides operate as performative elements of the work itself. 
In this sense, there was a parallel between Dark Sides and its own targets: 
13. Jason Cone, The Humanitarian’s Dilemma, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 15, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.
com/2015/07/15/the-humanitarians-dilemma-palestine-gaza-doctors-without-borders/ 
[https://perma.cc/L9UQ-NEQ3].
14. LORI ALLEN, THE RISE AND FALL OF HUMAN RIGHTS: CYNICISM AND POLITICS IN OCCUPIED 
PALESTINE 15 (2013) (“[H]uman rights has become the object and inspiration of cynicism 
for many Palestinians, the result of years of unfulfi lled promises, unregistered claims, and 
unsuccessful battles for political change.”).
15. Id. at 67.
16. Id. at 16.
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human rights, particularly in its naming and shaming mode, often aimed at 
remedy through revelation. Exposing abuse would contribute to its end. In an 
ironic twist, parts of Dark Sides seemed to aim at something similar: remedying 
blind faith through revelation and thus deepening the possibility for critique 
to shatter rather than merely reform. Over the years, however, both human 
rights abuses and the human rights enterprise remained entrenched and stable 
even in the face of revelation and disclosure. 
World of Struggle takes on this conundrum directly through the notion of 
sophisticated disenchantment, making it central to the experience, discourse, 
and practice of expertise. Contrary to his earlier calls to search out blind 
spots and biases, here Kennedy suggests that in doing so, analysts might 
“underestimate the fl exibility of expertise. . . . Opposing interests and ideas 
really have been domesticated into their argumentative material” (161). 
Whether in critique of his earlier argument or as a refl ection of the changing 
character of expertise in the twelve years between the two books, World of 
Struggle uses the notion of sophisticated disenchantment to describe the ways 
in which indeterminacy, indecision, and contradiction are both endemic to 
expertise and foundational to its seductive appeal.
On this basis, Kennedy explores the ways in which experts speak through 
a language of predictability, clarity, and consistent linkages between theories, 
methods, doctrines, and outcomes even while remaining aware that other 
experts will have an equally plausible set of counterarguments that link 
method or doctrine to outcome diff erently (152). World of Struggle off ers an 
expansive vision of a world in which expert knowledge and practice seek 
less to escape or obscure their unintended consequences than to incorporate 
them. Kennedy does not leave biases and blind spots behind; throughout 
the book, he highlights the ways in which the practice of expertise relegates 
interpretive choice and distribution to the background. But at the same time, 
he contextualizes doing so as part of a life of “sophisticated disenchantment” 
in which there is no ultimate faith without question but rather in which 
questioning in a particular way has become part of faith.
In this sense, Kennedy suggests a spectrum of belief and unbelief, or faith 
and its loss, rather than the binary that the terms might suggest. Experts in 
his work do not precisely act in bad faith, nor have they lost faith; rather, 
their faith has morphed, changed, and expanded through struggle. It is, as 
Kennedy says, “an ecumenical, eclectic, and disenchanted faith”—and for that 
reason, it is “astonishingly appealing” (20). Experts maintain the membership 
in their guild by neither professing faith nor confessing its loss.
This analysis—and Kennedy’s particular “mid-level” approach—leaves open 
questions about the experts themselves and the operation of this spectrum. For 
example, How universal is the experience of sophisticated disenchantment? 
Does it function diff erently for experts in, for example, fi nance than in the 
“virtue fi elds” discussed above? Moreover, how does the vernacular of 
expertise function diff erently for those embedded in one locale and for those 
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transnational practitioners who move from place to place in a world they 
understand as “globalized”?
Another way of considering this question is to ask who, precisely, is 
included in this broad category of not just experts but all those who deploy the 
language of expertise. Kennedy’s framework makes possible—and facilitates, 
through his open attention to method here—ongoing and plural queries 
about how diff erent professional communities relate to distribution and 
decision-making.17 At the same time, it leaves open multiple sociological and 
ethnographic questions. The expert experience of peace builders in eastern 
Congo might be diff erent from that of those delivering aid in Afghanistan 
or litigating human rights at the Israeli Supreme Court. Kennedy’s decision 
to discuss a vernacular, attitude, and language rather than a particular group 
or community suggests further fruitful inquiry into the conditions under 
which communities of experts, advocates, and practitioners become—or resist 
becoming—both sophisticated and disenchanted.
What has remained consistent from Dark Sides to World of Struggle is the plea 
for attention to law’s role in distribution and for the greater responsibility 
that comes with recognizing the character of one’s governance power. In his 
discussion of international legal expertise in World of Struggle, Kennedy suggests 
that “a kind of professional faith or practice of fealty . . . strengthens law’s 
authority while weakening the profession’s sense of responsibility” (218). While 
the experts of Struggle more comfortably inhabit ambivalence in a way that 
reduces the “unintended” aspect of the consequences, the experts and activists 
in both works govern from the background in a way that shies away from 
acknowledging power. Much of what World of Struggle illuminates, particularly 
in this dimension, are the reasons for the system’s stability. Exposing the dark 
sides or asking experts to face the unintended consequences of their work—
critical activities that seemed at one time destined to change the way the world 
worked—turned out to be part of the motor of continuity. It is a conundrum 
with which Kennedy begins the book: The object is “not to foretell collapse, 
but to explain the strange resilience of arrangements so many intuit to be 
nearing their end” (16).
In exposing and challenging that “strange resilience,” World of Struggle 
rests not only on Kennedy’s socio-legal investigations of expertise but on his 
experiences as a teacher: “As a law professor, I train experts” (277). The book 
begins and ends with the invocation and call to students and readers alike to 
imagine today as “1648,” the year of the Peace of Westphalia and Kennedy’s 
shorthand for a moment when the world can be remade. Yet, he also begins 
17. Levels of sophisticated disenchantment might diff er depending on a variety of circumstances. 
For example, in her 2014 ethnography of international peace builders, Séverine Autesserre 
reveals an industry built upon specifi c blind spots and biases, including dividing local from 
foreign and masking the reproduction of inequality. SÉVERINE AUTESSERRE, PEACELAND: 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND THE EVERYDAY POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION (2014). 
Her work recalls one of the early, foundational critiques of the destruction unwittingly 
wrought by the development enterprise. PETER UVIN, AIDING VIOLENCE: THE DEVELOPMENT 
ENTERPRISE IN RWANDA (1998).
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and ends with a concern that even in the face of an urgent, 1648-like moment, 
the response of his students (and others) remains one of ambivalent reform 
that will simply “kick things down the road, manage expectations, and, by 
rendering the problems sustainable, reaffi  rm the current distribution of 
powers” (17).
Implicit here is a call to arms to teachers as well as to practitioners, 
professionals, and students. The production of sophisticated disenchantment 
occurs not only once a lawyer practices or a development practitioner reaches 
“the fi eld,” but through a series of educational engagements that build their 
expertise. Indeed, it is a key aspect of much professionalizing pedagogy and 
apprenticeship, most obviously in law, to learn how to argue as if one believes 
a particular position, while at the very same time displaying the knowledge 
that it could plausibly be argued the opposite way. To do so requires enough 
investment to advocate passionately and enough detachment to appropriately 
accommodate counterargument. It breeds not loss of faith but a reformulated, 
optimistic, reformist, pragmatic, ecumenical faith (20). The requirement to 
internalize indeterminacy and to argue with certainty creates the foundation 
for a lifetime of expert engagement, so that the “most accomplished experts 
are not surprised—or troubled—by the uncertainty of their expertise. Often 
they seem emboldened. People make strong arguments but seem to have lost 
confi dence in the determinacy of their analytics. The odd thing is that it does 
not seem to matter” (9–10).
Kennedy describes a world in which neither confl ict nor argument 
destabilizes expertise; rather, those arguments recur and reproduce based 
on a “collective sensibility about what would ‘go too far’ ” (10). It is both in 
and after school that experts learn those boundaries and govern through and 
within them. Shared assumptions allow for arguments on the same terrain—
but the unspoken common sense underneath the assumptions makes it all 
the more likely that even those seeking great change will fall back on familiar 
reform agendas. 
Given the tendency of hidden background decisions and dominant 
scripts to reproduce inequality and injustice, what role should expertise play? 
World of Struggle argues less for abandonment than reimagination. In this 
work, Kennedy continues his long-term project of uncovering the hidden 
implications of multiple mundane “expert” decisions that shape a paradoxical 
world: one both unstable and unshakable. Here, fi nally, is the foundational 
ambition of World of Struggle and its challenge to readers: to undo the hegemony 
of common sense, to unlearn the boundaries of reason, to unsettle what has 
seemingly been seamlessly resolved, to untell the familiar stories of binaries 
and boundaries, to uncover the struggles that expertise obscures, and thus to 
unleash the possibility of remaking the world.
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